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GERALD P. O'DRISCOLL, JR.: BANK FAILURES:
THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CONNECTION
CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES
VOL. VI, NO. 2, APRIL 1988

The banking system in some countries was at the brink of collapse, while in other
countries it failed woefully. Consequently, policy response to banking failure in
countries of experience has been some measure of inteivention. Thus, as against the
working principles of economics, favouring the unfettered working of market forces,
regulations and regulatory institutions have been set-up by these countries to ensure
the safety of depositors money as well as enhancing the stability, hence the confidence
in the banking industry.
The existence of this regulatory body universally known as the Deposit Insurance
established to prop up the working of the banking system as well as other regulations,
are what the author contends with, believing that the banks would do better without
a regulatory outfit. In doing this, the article is divided into five parts; part I is
introductory, part II titled "Banking: Structure and Stability" reviews historically the
coming into being of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation of the United States
- a regulatory institution. Part III focuses on deregulation, and should emphasis be
placed on assets or liabilities?; while part IV makes a case study of a crisis ridden thrift
industry which lends support to his contention. Finally, part V assesses public policy
and the pitfalls of protecting the banking industry.
SUMMARY OF ARTICLE
In the introductory part, the author articulated the views ofFriedman and Schwartz
who are unfavourably disposed to general regulation of the banking system but accepts
the existence of deposit insurance; which in their view "was the most important
structural change in the banking system to result from the 1933 panic". In a historical
analysis into the problems that led to banking failure in the United States, and the
resultant establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), with
other binding regulations on commercial banks, the author agrees with Friedman and
Schwartz submission that annual bank failure declined from triple-digit to doubledigit to single-digit. However, the Glass-Steagall act- the banking act that established
the FDIC artificially segmented the banking industry which in the opinion of the author
has abated the competitive forces within the banking industry. Such segmentation
into commercial, investment and savings banking eliminated substantially competitive rivalry on a common field, and provided long-term stability. However, in a
comparative analysis prior to the Glass-Steagall act, the author concluded that States
that had the backing of regulatory deposit guarantee funds as against those that
diversified by bank branching had "abject banking failures"; as the liabilities of the
guaranteed funds greatly exceeded their assets". Hence, the banking act was effective
only on the ground that it protected the unit banking system that failed to diversify into
a net-work of branches; secondly, there was low bank failure; thirdly, that it reduced
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competitive financial forces, the deposit insurance protected the unit banks adequately from possible failure. Therefore, the author posited that bank failure was
reduced not on account of increased bank safety, rather, the substantial reduction of
competition among financial institutions.
While emphasizing other regulations the authorities imposes on banks, the author
noted that banks are usually prohibited from participating in equity investment in real
estate or undeIWiiting corporate securities considered to be inherently risky, but are
allowed to give commercial loans and invest in government bonds considered less risky
- this categorisation is based on the regulators' perception of average risk of assets as
against the marginal risk of assets assessment by portfolio managers. In line with the
rtsk perspective of portfolio managers, the author advocated for the deregulation of
banks capacity to earn more assets; the granting of such maximum freedom for assets
diversification enhances their assets base. As, in prtnciple, the author emphasized,
"adding to portfolios of risky assets can reduce overall risk". Similarly, the author
argued that "inflationary forces, technological advances, and financial innovation
combined to render obsolete regulation on interest rate on the liabilities of depository
institutions". Hence, like the assets, the better option in the author's opinion is the
complete deregulation on banks' liabilities. However, comparably, faced with the
option of which to deregulate - assets or liabilities, a less optimal solution to the
banking problem, the author opined that "regulating bank's powers or the composition
of their portfolios have proved better options than their liabilities".
However, in the view of the author, the optimal solution lies with the complete
deregulation on banks' assets and liabilities. The case study of the thrift crtsis ofTexas
savings and loans industry was cited eloquently for the necessity of deregulating the
banking system. Most of the managers of the Savings and Loans industry were
incompetent and consequently regarded as "living-dead zombies". With unrefined
managertal practices, and the eagerness to grow out of the prevailing problems, they
increased their liabilities position which enhanced their asset base; unfortunately,
however, the assets were undiversilled that with the spread of negative interest by
1983, they suffered from asset quality problems. Conclusively therefore, the author
said the existence of deposit insurance insulating and funding the operation of
zombies who in a "never-ending attempt to grow out ofever-increasing losses" compete
with solvent ones to bid up the cost of funds. And to salvage some of these zombies,
solvent banks used to bail out insolvent ones may become insolvent in the process.
This, the author noted cannot augur well for safe and sound financial system; except
the insolvent ones peter out.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The banking institution occupies a central position within the setting ofany nation's
economy; for this reason, it is not entirely left to the whims and caprices of economic
forces. However, as an industry, it must be dynamic, inventive and innovative in
meeting the changing circumstances of the time. In meeting the dynamics of the time
within a given competitive environment, excessive regulations that interferes with the
internal running of the banks would kill initiative and creativeness ofbanks to mobilise
and allocate resources in the most efficient manner that would enhance dividend of
shareholders. If, the essence of some of these regulations is to stabilise the banking
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system and enhance customers' confidentiality. but in the same vein, unavoidably
limiting the investment prospects of banks hence the profitability levels, amounts to
the proverbial killing of the goose that laid the golden eggs. In this wise, as long as profit
maximisation is the ultimate objective. excessive regulations on its assets and
liabilities could be counterproductive. In consequence, banks. under the circumstance. devices ingenious ways of circumventing policy regulations to realise the
expected profit levels. Empirical evidences in Nigeria shows that most banks established their finance houses and security atIUiates to serve as vents through which
customers or investors were directed and granted substantial loans and advances over
and above the level stipulated. Others too. established bureau-de-change as avenues
through which foreign currencies from official source were diverted in order to enhance
their earning capacities at the black market; thus. perpetuating the incidence of
round-tripping. In both examples, neither the reasons for the regulations nor the
banks sufficiently prevented from granting loans above the prescribed maximum were
achieved. However. the coming into force of decree 25 of 1991 bringing finance houses
under close supervision and control would seal-off the age-long loophole. On the other
hand, when treasury bills were deregulated, the 1990 annual report of the Nigerian
Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) shows that the resultant interest rate was very
attractive and encouraged banks to invest more into treasury bills than before. Like
any shrewd businessman, banks, as those examples show, are all out to make profit,
the basis of their corporate survival; hence, they need less regulations approximate to
a free enterprise environment to take advantage of market indicators.
It is in the light of this that one supports the view of the author advocating for the
entire deregulation of the banking system. However. whether an entirely deregulated
banking system would augur well for a developing economy like ours as against an
advanced economy on which the author based his opinion is another issue altogether.
Suffice to say here that, as long as banks recognize the need for sufficient liquidity to
meet depositors request. and appropriate colateral security to assuage loans and
advances granted, banks should be allowed to acquire any risky asset considered
highly profitable. In otherwords. regulations limiting them to certain category ofassets
should be dismantled, and they should be granted the freedom to diversify by acquiring
any asset no matter how risky. but adjudged highly profitable. Since profit making is
the basis of their continued survival, highly risky assets with substantial profit
margins would in effect reduce the overall risk standing. In this way, banks would be
much more self-sustainable, relying less on the Central Bank of Nigeria and the NDIC
insurance guarantee to bail them out at the slightest problem. Evidences have even
shown that less risky assets, in the perception of regulators, such as commercial loans
and government bonds are either less lucrative, contributing less to the overall profit
margin, or ironically. increasing their risk standing. For example, of the'nine distressed
banks in the NDIC 1990 report, for every one naira (N 1) loan, 7 5k is incollectible - this,
therefore. is the ironyofless risky assets annihilating the very existence of these banks.
Therefore. as long as profit is the prime motive ofbanks, they should be given the leeway
to finance any investment or acquire any asset in diversifying their assets base to
enhance their profit standing and indirectly safe-guarding depositors' interest. Assets
diversification therefore supports the merits of the conventional wisdom that disapproves putting all investments into one basket; and, of course, risks are better spread
with the resultant reduction of overall risk standing.
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In the same vein, the liabilities of banks be deregulated; thus, under a deregulated
atmosphere, efficiently run banks can flexibly and profitably adjust according to the
dictates of the time. However, in Nigeria, with the deregulation ofinterest rates, deposit
liability interest rate did not move as fast as the lending rate. Hence, the increasing
divergency between the two rates got to levels uncomfortable to policy makers. At an
estimated average of32 per cent interest rate puts to question the reliability ofabsolute
deregulation in a developing economy fraught with profound market imperfections.
Another issue raised by the author that is of practical relevance to the Nigerian
context, partly if not wholly responsible for banking failures is the enthronement of
inexperienced personnel to manage risk-taking institutions like banks. Aptly described,
"the Texas Zombies" have their equivalents in Nigerian banking industry. Of the nine
distressed banks reported by NDIC, among others, ineffective management by staff
and board members whose appointments were not based on merit, administrative
problems, internal wranglings leading to the polarisation of the rank and file, poor
internal control systems characterised by poor loans and advances and fraud are some
of the causes ofdistress which invariably are the hallmarks ofinexperienced personnel
at top management positions. In the author's opinion, any financial assistance by
NDIC would imply funding the continued existence of the Nigerian banking zombies;
who, in attempt to get out of their problems are in the habit of bidding up the cost of
funds at the expense of solvent banks.-Again, the NDIC request for a solvent bank to
take over and manage a distressed bank can possibly lead to the distress of the
managing bank. In this wise, NDIC has further accentuated the distressed nature of
the banking industry.
However, much as the author does not see the relevance of a regulatoiy institution
like the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), one does not accept its.
scrapping because of the possible aforementioned defects. Frankly, a distressed bank
should have been left to either swim ashore or sink as the case may be; however, the
effects on the image hence the confidence of the banking industry cannot be
underemphasized. It is axiomatic that a regulatoiy body cannot prevent a failing bank
from going into eventual liquidation; however, it can possibly cushion the effects on
the banking industiy in salvaging a failing bank. This is necessaiy, because, the
banking industry as an intermediary institution between the surplus and deficit units
occupies a unique position in the workability and development of any economy that
it must be well guarded to sustain the trust and confidence reposed on it. Therefore,
the need for, and the role of a regulatoiy institution to safeguard the trust and
confidence of customers is, basically, not to reinforce the existence of banking zombies.
Run as an insurance outfit - serving as a common pool of risk to all insured banks,
funds thereof are used to assist the insured but financially distressed banks. In the
capacity of a consultant, and in addition to the financial assistance given, a regulatoiy
institution can recommend and seek for the immediate replacement of incompetent
zombies, these may go a long way to salvage an otherwise distressed bank to a buoyant
one. In that same capacity, early warning information to owners of the bank which
some management staff could have supppressed owing to the interest of their
appointments can redress the situation in good time. Thus, the provision ofmanagement
information with the view to curbing excesses likely to engender insolvency are some
of the crucial roles of the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation. For instance, it was
observed that (NDIC 1990 Report) most of the poor loans granted were to State
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governments, contractors handling State governments projects but unpaid for the
work done, and unsecured lending. Fraud which has risen to 666 per cent in 1990 was
equally mentioned; in an these, the affected banks may have taken the necessary
action to redress their critical situations, and in the long-run, enhance the stability of
the banking industry.
At any rate, where a solvent bank is to assume the management of an insolvent
bank, the probable course of action of the solvent bank is to avoid the pitfalls of the
former managers of the insolvent bank. It should therefore, with the assistance of
NDIC, avoid being drawn along by the deepening problems of the insolvent bank when
it has become inevitable. Therefore, in the event ofliquidation, NDIC plays a major role
ofan unbiased umpire assisting depositors to regain part ifnot substantial part of their
deposits; thus, allaying the fears and agony of customers losing entirely their life time
savings. Consequently, these roles can only be performed by an established regulatory
institution which the author has strongly queried its relevance and thus argued for its
scrapping.
From the foregoing, the necessity for regulatory institution does not in any way
suggest excessive regulations on the activities of the banking industry. In fact. the
NDIC roles are rather complementary, and do not as in the case of general regulations
inhibit the banks' capability to acquire any asset or take on any liability. However, with
respect to general regulations, and as noted above, the desirability for an entirely
deregulated banking system in a developing economy as against the developed one
remain questionable. In this regard, three basic interests are identifiable - namely,
the interest of banks, the interest of depositors and the interest of the nation with
respect to the running of the economy. Arguably, the deregulation stoutly defended in
support of the views of the author tally with the interest of the banks. An interest which
allows banks to acquire any asset or take on any liability as they deem it necessary in
the ordinary course of their businesses without regulatory inhibitions. Secondly, in
disagreeing with the author as regards; the position of a regulatory institution such as
the NDIC, the interest of depositors was the uppermost. Because, every action to
safeguard banks boils down to protecting depositors from unexpected losses. However,
when the interest of the nation is considered, moreso in a developing economy
characterised with profound market imperfections and observed perverse behaviour
of some basic economic parameters, it is difficult to leave the banks in the world of their
own. Because, the interest of individual banks does not align with the national interest
which has led to non-compliance, manipulations to sidetrack policy stipulations. For
example, when interest rates were deregulated, market forces did not produce the
desired results acceptable to policy makers - this is so, because of structural
deficiency, institutional rigidity and imperfect flowofinformation among others. Policy
responSt to interest rates behaviour was some measure of intervention; therefore, in
this regard, there must be some form of regulatory interventions that seek to fine-tune
the economy towards the path of growth and development other than the micro
behaviour of banks. Interestingly, the national interest of monetary authorities would
be enhanced when indirect monetary policies come into play without sacrificing banks
interest. At that time, each interest would be almost safeguarded hence unviolated.
Another point of difference with the author lies With his observed opinion that the
reduction in competition owing to the segmentation of the banking industry into three
specialised fields accounted substantially for the low bank failure achieved by the
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deposit insurance. Admittedly, the Glass-Steagall act in segmenting the banking
industry into commercial, investment and savings banking, perhaps, for the purposes
of specialisation and efficiency, the obseIVed fall in competitive rivalry must be a
momentruy phenomenon. As, overtime, in each banking field, competition would
become very intense, does that presuppose that there cannot be other means of
ensuring low bank failure? Certainly, in addition to the roles ofNDIC, safety measures
such as the prudential guidelines, capital adequacy requirement would go a long way
to ensuring safe and sound financial system.
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